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Whether conflict and ambiguity are distinct kinds of uncertainty remains an open
question, as does their joint impact on judgments of overall uncertainty. This paper
reviews recent advances in our understanding of human judgment and decision making
when both ambiguity and conflict are present, and presents two types of testable models
of judgments under conflict and ambiguity. The first type concerns estimate-pooling
to arrive at “best” probability estimates. The second type is models of subjective
assessments of conflict and ambiguity. These models are developed for dealing with
both described and experienced information. A framework for testing these models in
the described-information setting is presented, including a reanalysis of a multi-nation
data-set to test best-estimate models, and a study of participants’ assessments of
conflict, ambiguity, and overall uncertainty reported by Smithson (2013). A framework
for research in the experienced-information setting is then developed, that differs
substantially from extant paradigms in the literature. This framework yields newmodels of
“best” estimates and perceived conflict. The paper concludes with specific suggestions
for future research on judgment and decision making under conflict and ambiguity.
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Introduction
Whether conflict and ambiguity are distinct kinds of uncertainty remains an open question, as
does their joint impact on judgments of overall uncertainty. Several experimental judgment studies
(Smithson, 1999, 2013; Cabantous, 2007; Cabantous et al., 2011; Baillon et al., 2012) support
the claim that conflict and ambiguity are distinct. However, in some generalized probability
frameworks that deal in sets of probabilities, this distinction appears unnecessary or irrelevant (an
accessible survey of such frameworks is provided in Augustin et al., 2014). This paper reviews recent
advances in our understanding of human judgment and decision making when both ambiguity and
conflict are present, and presents new models and methodological suggestions regarding research
on this topic.
There is some confusion regarding the concepts of ambiguity and conflict. In this paper, we
take ambiguity to mean either a set of possible qualitative states or a range of possible values
on a continuum. An example of the former is the meaning of “hot” in the statement “This
food is hot,” where “hot” could mean “high temperature,” “spicy,” “stolen,” “sexy,” and so on.
An example of the latter is an interval estimate, such as “My weight is somewhere between 74
and 75 kg.” We define conflict as referring to disagreements among sources about some aspect
of reality. An example is one bushfire expert estimating the probability of a major bushfire in a
particular woodland as “more than 0.5” while another bushfire expert estimates this probability
as “less than 0.5.” Thus, ambiguity is a type of uncertainty that can arise from one message,
Smithson Probability judgments under ambiguity and conflict
whereas conflict is a type of uncertainty arising from multiple
messages.
There are two types of settings for judgments and decisions
under uncertainty, and the literature comparing them has almost
exclusively dealt with judgments of probability. The first, and
most widely studied, is the described-information setting. The
judges or decision makers are presented with a description of
the uncertainties inherent in their task (typically the probabilities
of relevant events or outcomes). The second setting is the
experienced-information setting (Rakow and Newell, 2010),
wherein judges sample outcomes from an environment and build
up their own assessments of event or outcome probabilities on
the basis of their samples. There is debate concerning whether
the heuristics people use for judging probabilities and making
decisions in these two settings differ or are essentially the same.
In this paper we will extend this debate to uncertainties arising
from ambiguous and conflicting information.
Recently formal, quasi-rational, models of judgments
under conflict and ambiguity have been proposed (Gajdos
and Vergnaud, 2013; Smithson, 2013) with parameters to
represent judges’ orientations toward conflictive and ambiguous
uncertainties. These models are amenable to empirical tests via
their predictions of what human judges will do, and they can be
applied to both described- and experienced-information settings,
although they were developed in the first setting.
This paper presents a program for researching judgments
when information is both conflicting and ambiguous. The section
following this one discusses two types of testable models of
judgments under conflict and ambiguity. The first type concerns
estimate-pooling to arrive at “best” probability estimates. The
second type is models of subjective assessments of conflict
and ambiguity. These models are developed for dealing with
both described and experienced information. The next section
presents a framework in the described-information setting. It
includes a reanalysis of a data-set to test best-estimate models,
and a study of participants’ assessments of conflict, ambiguity,
and overall uncertainty reported by Smithson (2013). The section
thereafter develops a framework for research in the experienced-
information setting. The paper then concludes with a discussion
of specific future directions for this line of research.
Models
“Best” Estimates and Preferences
We assume that K diagnostic judges provide estimates of a
probability, of the form [pk1, pk2, . . . , pkJ], where the pkj are
order statistics: pk1 < pk2 < . . . < pkJ . The simplest setup of
this kind, which we shall consider, has two judges, each of whom
provides a lower and upper estimate, so that K = 2 and J = 2.
In some situations, decision makers (DMs) may wish to
determine what the “best” estimate of this probability is, and/or
their assessments regarding optimism or pessimism of the
judges’ estimates. For example, what is the “best” estimate of a
probability, given the interval estimate [0.3, 0.6]? And if offered
a second interval estimate of the same probability, say [0.2, 0.7],
does one interval indicate a higher probability than the other and,
if so, which one?
A conventional approach to described-information estimates
of this kind is to assume a uniform distribution over the interval,
so its midpoint is the “best” estimate and, in our example,
both intervals yield identical best estimates. More generally, this
“midpoint model” is a special case of the widely-used weighted
arithmetic averaging method (or linear pool) for combining
alternative estimates to arrive at a best estimate. According to this
approach, if the event under consideration is a reward, then any
DM who regards a value below the midpoint as the best estimate
is pessimistic (or risk-averse) and a value above the midpoint
indicates optimism (or risk-seeking).
A factor that, to my knowledge, has not been systematically
considered in research on ambiguity, is the assumptions that
the DM makes about how the interval has been constructed.
Different assumptions can yield quite different pooling methods
and results for the “best” estimate and, therefore, for inferences
about DM risk orientations and comparisons among interval
estimates. I will demonstrate this point with imprecise probability
models fromWalley (1991, p. 93–96).
Suppose the DM assumes that the interval reflects a tax on
gambles of the kind that is used in some betting agencies. If a
bookmaker regards Pv as the probability of a gamble paying off,
then s/he will only offer to bet at a reduced rate, (1 – w) Pv,
where 0 < w < 1 and w is the profit-margin desired by the
bookmaker. Thus, Pv is a coherent probability for which p1 and
p2 are the corresponding lower and upper probabilities of the
linear-vacuous mixture described byWalley. Setting p2−p1 = w,
we have p1 = (1− w)Pv and p2 = (1− w)Pv + w. So, when
presented with the interval
[
p1, p2
]
, our DMderives Pv as follows:
Pv =
p1
1− p2 + p1
. (1)
Denoting the interval midpoint by Pm, it is easy to show that
Pv = Pm iff p1 + p2 = 1, and otherwise Pv > (<)Pm ⇔
p1 + p2 > (<) 1. For our example intervals, [0.3, 0.6] and [0.2,
0.7], Pm = 0.45 in both cases, whereas for [0.3, 0.6] Pv = 0.429
and for [0.2, 0.7] Pv = 0.4. A midpoint DM arrives at identical
“best estimates” both intervals, whereas the vacuous-linear DM
obtains a higher “best estimate” for [0.3, 0.6] than for [0.2, 0.7].
The contrast between the midpoint and linear-vacuous models is
greatest when either interval limit approaches its bound on the
unit interval. From Equation (1) it is clear that as p1 approaches
0, Pv also approaches 0; and Pv approaches 1 as p2 approaches 1.
If two intervals with identical midpoints do not generally
produce identical Pv-values, what pair of intervals will do
so? Given two intervals,
[
p1, p2
]
and
[
q1, q2
]
, a bit of
algebra suffices to show that their Pv-values are identical
when p1
/ (
1− p2
)
= q1
/ (
1− q2
)
. Thus, in contrast with our
previous example of the midpoint-equivalent pair of intervals
[0.3, 0.6] and [0.2, 0.7], the vacuous-linear DM’s pair would be
[0.3, 0.6] and [0.15, 0.8].
A different taxation scheme provides different best estimates.
Another example from Walley (1991, p. 95–96) is a “capital
gains tax” setup, in which p1 = (1− t)Pc
/
(1− tPc) and
p2 = Pc
/
(1− tPc), where Pc is the best estimate for this model
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 674
Smithson Probability judgments under ambiguity and conflict
and 0 < t < 1. In this scheme, we have
Pc =
p2
1+p2−p1
t =
p2−p1
p2
(2)
It is easy to show that Pc = Pv iff p1 + p2 = 1; otherwise
Pc > (<) Pv ⇔ p1 + p2 < (>) 1, and that Pm falls in between
them.
Indefinitely many taxation schemes can be invented (e.g., the
Parimutuel system that is popular in horse-racing, or changing
the scale of what is being taxed, as in a linear-vacuous model that
taxes the probability of winning in the logit scale). There are two
main points to this material. First, the rational “best” estimate
for a probability interval depends on how the DM believes
interval has been constructed. We shall see this point playing
a crucial part in the development of a framework for research
on ambiguity and conflict from experience. Second, the fact that
there are multiple models for best estimates enriches the study of
how humans make their own best estimates, both by providing
a variety of models to compare with human performance and
by cautioning researchers against simplistic imputations of “risk-
aversion” or “risk-seeking” to estimates that deviate from the
interval midpoint. It also is possible that people may use methods
for pooling conflicting estimates that differ from those they use
for pooling ambiguous ones.
Models of Assessments of Ambiguity and
Conflict
Given the setup discussed in the preceding subsection, the kth
judge’s assessment is ambiguous insofar as the pkj diverge in
some sense from one another, and we will consider functions
A(pkj) to measure ambiguity. Likewise, judges’ assessments may
conflict with one another insofar as their assessments differ in
some sense from each other, and we will also consider functions
C(pkj) to measure conflict. Finally, a decision maker (DM) who
is given these judges’ assessments may have a subjective appraisal
of the combined uncertainty resulting from both ambiguity and
conflict that weighs these two uncertainty components according
to their relative aversiveness for the DM. We will therefore
investigate uncertainty functions S(α, θ,C(pkj),A(pkj)) that are
monotonically increasing in C(pkj) and A(pkj), where α is the
conflict weight and θ is the ambiguity weight.
Both variance and distance are reasonable uncertainty metrics
for both ambiguity and conflict. Ambiguity effects on judgments
and decisions have been explained in terms of variance (Rode
et al., 1999), and conflict also has implications for variability
in outcomes. For the models described here, the variance and
distance versions are equivalent, so we shall restrict attention to
the variance version. The ambiguity of each judge’s estimates can
be measured by
Ak =
J∑
j= 1
(
pkj − pk.
)2
/J, (3)
so that the total ambiguity is just the within-judge component of
the variance of the pkj:
A =
K∑
k= 1
Ak/K,
where pk. is the mean judgment for the k
th judge. The between-
judge variance component is an intuitively plausible candidate
for measuring conflict:
C1 =
K∑
k= 1
(
pk. − p..
)2
/K, (4)
where p.. is the grand mean. However, an alternative conflict
measure is the variance among the order-statistics of the same
rank (i.e., the variance of the pkj around p.j):
C2 =
K∑
k= 1
J∑
j= 1
(
pkj − p.j
)2
/JK. (5)
I shall refer to the first model (Equation 4) as variance component
model 1 (VC1) and the second (Equation 5) as VC2. The conflict
function in Equation (5) differs from that in Equation (4) in an
important way, because when pk. are identical for all K judges,
C1 = 0 whereas this is not true for C2. Thus, VC1 predicts that
a pair of interval estimates with identical midpoints will not be
perceived by the DM as conflictive, whereas VC2 predicts that
they will be.
Gajdos and Vergnaud (2013) present a model of decision
making under ambiguity and conflict based on the Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1989) maxmin framework. They intended their
model to apply to probability judgments; Smithson (2013)
extends it to judgments of magnitudes and describes the two-
state, two-judge special case of their model. This version of the
Gajdos–Vergnaud (GV) model is reproduced here.
In the GV model, the α and θ weights are used to modify
the order statistics of each judge. The θ parameter contracts the
[pk1, pk2] interval around its midpoint at a rate 1 − θ , yielding
lower and upper bounds.
pik1 = pk1(1+ θ)/2+ pk2(1− θ)/2,
pik2 = pk1(1− θ)/2+ pk2(1+ θ)/2.
(6)
Gajdos and Vergnaud do not define an ambiguity measure
along the lines of those in this paper, but as with the variance
and distance models we may construct one by summing the
differences pik2−pik1. Smithson (2013) shows that this measure is
a simple function of the ambiguity measure in a distance model.
The GV model treats α as contracting the pairs of interval
endpoints pkj and pmj (i.e., the k
th and mth judges’ estimates of
the jth endpoint) around their mean at the rate1 − α. Thus, the
order statistics are modified in the following way:
γkj = pkj(1+ α)/2+ pmj(1− α)/2,
γmj = pmj(1+ α)/2+ pkj(1− α)/2.
(7)
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Again, Gajdos and Vergnaud do not define a conflict measure
but one may be defined by summing the absolute values of the
differences γkj− γmj. Smithson (2013) shows that this measure is
a simple function of a C2 measure in a distance model.
The models of ambiguity and conflict developed here are
testable, and they differ in their predictions of how people will
assess ambiguity, conflict, and thus overall uncertainty when they
are presented with alternative probability estimates of the same
event. They are amenable to being tested in both described- and
experienced-information settings.
Ambiguity and Conflict in
Described-Information Settings
Ambiguity has been widely studied in experimental judgment
and decision making research, beginning with Ellsberg’s (1961)
classic experiments. The most common description of an
ambiguous probability in these experiments is an interval (e.g.,
“the probability of event E is somewhere between 0.2 and 0.5,”
or “the probability of event E is unknown”). To my knowledge,
no studies have involved disjoint sets of probabilities (e.g., “the
probability of event E is either 0.2 or 0.5”). Indeed, the distinction
between alternative discrete possible states and a continuous
range of values for some quantity is largely absent from the
psychological literature (but see Guney and Newell, 2014).
Conflict, on the other hand, readily yields disjoint sets of
probabilities (e.g., “expert A estimates the probability of event E
to be 0.2 whereas expert B estimates it to be 0.5”). Several studies
have compared people’s assessments of uncertainty arising from
ambiguity vs. conflict, with a general result that people seem to
prefer ambiguous but agreeing riskmessages to unambiguous but
conflicting messages (Smithson, 1999; Cabantous, 2007; Baillon
et al., 2012). However, there have been very few attempts to
systematize such comparisons.
Study 1: Best Estimates
To date, there are no studies of how people pool estimates
that are both ambiguous and conflicting. However, we may
put the three best-estimate models developed in the preceding
sections (themidpoint, linear-vacuous, and capital-gainsmodels)
to an empirical test in a described-information setting where
ambiguity is present. The dataset for this purpose is the
product of a 25-sample, 24-nation, 17-language study of
laypeople’s interpretations of the probability expressions that
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
has employed in their recent reports on climate scientists’
assessments of climate change. In recent assessments the IPCC
has used verbal descriptions of uncertainty (e.g., “Likely”)
accompanied by a numerical translation (e.g., in the case of
“Likely,” an interval from 0.66 to 1). Budescu et al. (2014)
presented participants with eight sentences from the IPCC
fourth report, each containing a single probability expression.
The expressions included “Likely,” “Very Likely,” “Unlikely,” and
“Very Unlikely;” each of which was presented in two of the
sentences. Participants were then asked to provide “lowest,”
“highest,” and “best” numerical estimates of the probability they
believed was intended by the authors of each sentence.
Budescu et al. (2014) found that laypeople interpret IPCC
probability expressions as probabilities closer to 50% than
intended by the IPCC authors. They demonstrated that an
alternative presentation format that embedded the appropriate
numerical range in the sentence along with the probability
expression increased the correspondence between the public’s
interpretations and the IPCC guidelines, but still did not
eradicate the regressive tendency in laypeople’s interpretations.
Our interest here is in the relationship between the “best”
estimates and their lower and upper counterparts, and how well
the midpoint, linear-vacuous, and capital-gains models describe
that relationship. The original data-set contains 10,792 responses.
After eliminating those with indications that the participant may
not have understood the task (those whose estimates violated the
ordering lower≤ best≤ upper), 8665 responses were retained for
the following analyses.
The three models’ predictions are very strongly inter-
correlated (0.963 for midpoint and linear-vacuous, 0.995 for
midpoint and capital-gains, and 0.939 for linear-vacuous and
capital-gains), so gross measures such as correlations are not
sufficient to detect whether one model is better than another.
Instead, we shall examine the root-mean-square (RMS) error
between each model’s predictions and the best estimates, and the
model’s “hit-rate,” defined as how often each model’s predictions
differ less than 0.05 from the best estimates (the results turn out
to be insensitive to the choice of 0.05 or other nearby thresholds).
Themidpoint model has the lowest RMS error, 0.081, followed
by the capital-gains model with 0.093 and the linear-vacuous
model with 0.123. The models’ hit-rates for departing less than
0.05 from the best estimates echoes this ordering, as shown in
Table 1. Themidpointmodel’s hit-rate is 75.1%, while the capital-
gains model hit-rate is 59.8% and the linear-vacuous model hit-
rate is 49.1%. The format in which the probability expressions
were presented has no effect on these results, and nor does the
probability expression. Moreover, as is the case with the results
reported by Budescu et al. (2014), these results are quite stable
across countries. Both the RMS error order and hit-rate order
found here hold for each of the 25 samples.
Table 1 also cross-tabulates the three pairs of models, showing
that large percentages of the hits for the capital-gains and linear-
vacuous models also are hits for the midpoint model, whereas
the converse does not hold nearly as strongly. In the midpoint
vs. capital-gains table, only 3544 out of 42,083 hits for the
capital-gains model (8.4%) are not also hits for the midpoint
model, whereas 14,431 out of 53,290 (27.1%) midpoint hits are
not also capital-gains hits. Likewise, in the midpoint vs. linear-
vacuous table, only 12.2% of the linear-vacuous hits are not also
midpoint hits, whereas 42.6% of the midpoint hits are not also
linear-vacuous hits. Again, the format in which the probability
expressions were presented and the country or language have no
effect on these patterns.
In the Budescu et al. project, participants also were asked
to provide “lowest,” “highest,” and “best” numerical estimates of
the probability they associate with their own interpretations of
probability expressions such as “Likely,” outside of any particular
context. The models’ performances in predicting the context-free
best estimates are very similar to what we have just seen. Again,
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TABLE 1 | Three models’ hit-frequencies.
CAPITAL-GAINS
Midpoint >0.05 <0.05
>0.05 14,084 3544 17,628
<0.05 14,431 38,859 53,290 Capital-gains hit-rate
28,515 42,403 70,918 59.8%
Midpoint hit-rate 75.1%
LINEAR-VACUOUS
Midpoint >0.05 <0.05
>0.05 13,367 4261 17,628
<0.05 22,712 30,578 53,290 Linear-vacuous hit-rate
36,079 34,839 70,918 49.1%
Midpoint hit-rate 75.1%
LINEAR-VACUOUS
Capital-G. >0.05 <0.05
>0.05 19,308 9207 28,515
<0.05 16,771 25,632 42,403 Linear-vacuous hit-rate
36,079 34,839 70,918 49.1%
Capital-gains hit-rate 59.8%
the midpoint model has the lowest RMS error, 0.083, followed
by the capital-gains model with 0.093 and the linear-vacuous
model with 0.129. The midpoint model’s hit-rate is 80.6%, while
the capital-gains model hit-rate is 63.0% and the linear-vacuous
model hit-rate is 51.0%. Finally, only 4.9% of the capital-gains
model hits are not also midpoint hits, whereas 25.7% of the
midpoint hits are not also capital-gains hits; and only 7.1% of the
linear-vacuous hits are not also midpoint hits, whereas 41.3% of
the midpoint hits are not also linear-vacuous hits. Overall, the
evidence is fairly strong that the midpoint model best describes
the relationship between the best estimates and their lower and
upper counterparts.
Study 2: Assessing Conflict and Ambiguity
The study reported by Smithson (2013) examined how people
make comparisons between pairs of interval estimates that are
potentially both ambiguous and conflicting. This subsection
summarizes that study; readers wishing for more detail may
consult the 2013 paper. The study focused on four questions:
1. Do nested intervals (special case: identical midpoints) imply
no conflict?
2. Do identical envelopes of intervals (i.e., the lowest and
highest of their endpoints) imply equal conflict and/or equal
ambiguity? What about identical interval endpoint averages?
3. Does conflict covary with the magnitudes of the differences
between corresponding pairs of interval endpoints?
4. Do judgments of degrees of conflict and ambiguity both
contribute independently to judgments of overall uncertainty?
The rationale for the first three questions was based on
disagreements among different evidence-pooling rules, and the
fourth question was motivated by the aforementioned evidence
that people treat ambiguity and conflict as distinct kinds of
uncertainty.
Method
Hypotheses and the models were tested via an online study,
with a North American sample of 508 adults (205 women,
189 men, 1 unspecified; with mean age = 39.95, sd = 15.04),
recruited through Qualtrics, of which 395 cases were found to
be trustworthy. The experimental design had two conditions,
but these proved irrelevant to the results presented here (see
Smithson, 2013 for details).
Four comparisons between two pairs of estimates, {P1,Q1}
and {P2,Q2}, were used to test questions 1–3, their results
also lending insight into question 4. These comparisons are
graphed in Figure 1. Comparison 1 simply tested whether
people would perceive the agreeing but ambiguous intervals
as more ambiguous and less conflictive than the precise but
disagreeing point-estimates. Comparisons 2 and 3 tested question
1, Comparisons 3 and 4 tested question 2 (Comparison 3 because
the interval endpoint averages are identical, and Comparison
4 because their envelopes are identical), and Comparisons 2–
4 partially tested question 3. Participants were presented with
both the graphs and verbal statements of the estimate pairs. They
were asked to choose which pair of estimates exhibited more
agreement, which exhibited more ambiguity, and which made
them feel more uncertain about the quantity being estimated.
Results
As expected, in Comparison 1 a large majority of participants
(84.3%) rated the two pointwise estimates as more conflictive
than the identical intervals (95% CI = 80.4, 87.6%). Regarding
question 1, as expected, in Comparisons 2 and 3 large majorities
of respondents chose the nested interval pair as being more
conflictive than the identical interval pair. An unexpected finding
was that in Comparison 4, 61.5% chose the nested interval
pair as more conflictive than the non-nested, overlapping pair
(95% CI = 56.6, 66.2%). The results suggest that nested interval
estimates are perceived as conflictive even when they have
identical midpoints.
The finding regarding conflict in Comparison 4 also addresses
questions 2 and 3. Thus, neither identical envelopes nor equal
differences between pairs of endpoints ensures that pairs of
estimates are regarded as equally conflicting. The finding for
Comparison 3 demonstrates that identical average interval
widths for pairs of estimates also do not ensure that they are
perceived as equally conflicting.
A mixed logistic regression model utilizing the data from all
four comparisons was used to address question 4, the impact of
ambiguity and conflict on judgments of overall uncertainty. The
model included main-effects terms for comparisons, ambiguity
and agreement (conflict), with random effects for the latter two
covariates. A model with interaction terms did not improve fit
significantly [X2(6) = 9.642, p = 0.141]. Both the agreement
and ambiguity terms were significant in the expected directions
(a negative impact on uncertainty for agreement, z = −6.576,
p < 0.0005; and positive impact on uncertainty for conflict,
z = 12.568, p < 0.0005). That said, Smithson (2013) also
found that judgments of ambiguity and agreement were strongly
negatively related for all four comparisons (i.e., ambiguity and
conflict are positively associated). The odds of choosing {P1,Q1}
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FIGURE 1 | Four pairs of judged probability intervals.
as the more ambiguous pair were higher if the respondent also
chose {P2,Q2} as the more agreeable (and vice versa). The odds-
ratios for Comparisons 1, 2, 3, and 4 were convincing: 2.90, 6.79,
14.13, and 22.84, respectively.
Finally, we turn to the performance of themodels of ambiguity
and conflict assessment described in the preceding section.
Smithson (2013) evaluated their performance in two ways:
Assigning each a “pass” or “fail” for every prediction made
by each model regarding comparative conflict, ambiguity, or
uncertainty; and using the differences between the scores each
model assigns to every relevant pair of estimates to predict
respondent choices via mixed logistic regressions. Both methods
consistently indicated that, for conflict, the GV and VC2 models
performed similarly and better than the VC1 model. The
results for ambiguity were equivocal, with no model consistently
outperforming the others. None of the models predicted the
unexpected finding in comparison 4.
Discussion
The main findings of this study may be summarized as follows.
1. Do nested intervals (special case: identical midpoints) imply
no conflict? Generally, no. In fact, in Comparison 4 people
tended to judge a pair of nested intervals as more conflictive
than a non-nested pair.
2. Do identical envelopes of intervals imply equal conflict and/or
equal ambiguity? What about identical interval endpoint
averages? No, in both cases, regarding conflict. However, the
results for ambiguity were inconclusive.
3. Does conflict covary with the magnitudes of the differences
between corresponding pairs of interval endpoints? No,
and again the Comparison 4 result was strongly counter-
indicative.
4. Do judgments of degrees of conflict and ambiguity both
contribute independently to judgments of overall uncertainty?
Yes, although the two-alternative forced choices for these
two properties appear to be fairly strongly related. This is
not necessarily an irrational association, given that there are
situations where ambiguity can generate conflict or conflict
can generate ambiguity.
Finally, the performance of the models suggests that the VC1
type of model is inadequate and may be abandoned. The model
results also suggest that VC2 andGV needmodification in at least
two respects. First, Smithson (2013) reports that in Comparisons
2–4 themajority choice of which pair is more ambiguous switches
depending on which pair is seen as showing more agreement.
Thus, an appropriate next step would be to build and test models
of conflict and ambiguity assessment that take this relationship
into account.
The second recommended modification stems from the
Comparison 4 finding. One interpretation of the respondents’
conflict choices in Comparisons 2–4 is that some people
may perceive differences in interval widths as indicating
disagreement. Thus, the second pair of estimates in Comparison
4 is doubly penalized for conflict because the endpoints differ and
so do the interval widths, whereas in the first pair the endpoints
differ by the same amounts but the interval widths agree (i.e.,
the experts are equally vague). The ensuing recommendation
is to amend the conflict models to accommodate a penalty for
differing vagueness. Smithson (2013) made this modification and
demonstrated that the augmented models’ performance in the
logistic regressions was substantially improved.
Ambiguity and Conflict in
Experienced-Information Settings
Ambiguity from Experience
The extension of experiments using an experienced-information
setup to studies of ambiguity is quite recent, with three
publications thus far (Dutt et al., 2013; Ert and Trautmann,
2014; Guney and Newell, 2014). As yet, there are no
studies investigating conflictive uncertainty in the experienced-
information setting. These three papers present evidence
apparently showing that ambiguity aversion is reduced by
sampling experience, in comparison with the levels usually found
in the described-information setting.
However, each of these papers presents a different sampling
method for experiencing “ambiguity.” I will argue here that none
of them actually provides direct experience of ambiguity, and
that this explains the decreased levels of ambiguity aversion. Ert
and Trautmann’s setup involves a fixed probability of a favorable
outcome, and Dutt et al. (2013) has an underlying uniform
distribution on the unit interval that determines the probability
of a favorable outcome. These probabilities are unknown to the
participants, but they learn them if they draw sufficiently large
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samples. Finally, the Guney–Newell (Guney and Newell, 2014)
setup uses three second-order distributions for determining the
probability of a favorable outcome on each turn. However, in
all of these papers, the samples that participants draw from the
“ambiguous” alternative are unambiguous outcomes, just like
those that they would draw from an alternative whose probability
has been revealed to them. The only sense in which participants
could be said to be experiencing “ambiguity” is the greater
variability of the outcome probabilities in the Dutt et al. and
Guney–Newell setups thanwould be obtained by sampling events
whose probabilities are fixed.
What is required instead is that participants experience
ambiguous outcomes, i.e., the participant is left unsure about
whether they have received a favorable outcome or not. Situations
like this are readily found, as in inconclusive diagnostic medical
examinations, “fog-of-war” occurrences in warfare, or failures to
reject the null hypothesis in so-called Neyman–Pearson statistical
inference.
What difference will ambiguous outcomes make to
participants’ judgments? Will they simply ignore them and
base their judgments and decisions on the unambiguous
outcomes alone? A straightforward experiment to test this would
compare judgments from participants exposed to both the
ambiguous and unambiguous outcomes with judgments from
participants exposed to only the unambiguous outcomes.
It seems likely that participants will estimate probabilities
differently when sampling ambiguous outcomes than they do
when they are presented with described probability intervals.
For instance, suppose we observe 45 favorable outcomes out of
60 trials, but we also have 40 trials where the outcome is not
clear. What is a reasonable “best” estimate of the probability
of a favorable outcome? A DM using a described-information
standpoint would derive an interval of [0.45, 0.85] for this
probability and then take its midpoint, 0.65, as the best estimate.
However, a frequentist DM would observe that 45 out of 60
trials have been favorable where the outcomes are known, so this
DM’s best estimate would be the maximum likelihood estimate,
45/60= 0.75. A Bayesian DMmay arrive at yet another estimate,
depending on that DM’s prior.
Ironically, the frequentist DM’s best estimate actually is
independent of the number of trials, N, say. Suppose the
frequentist’s interval is
[
f1
/
N, f2
/
N
]
=
[
p1, p2
]
, where f1 is
the number of favorable events and f2 − f1 is the number of
ambiguous events. Then the frequentist best estimate is based
entirely on the unambiguous data, i.e., f1 favorable and N –
f2 unfavorable events. The frequentist’s best estimate of the
probability of a favorable event is then just the ratio of favorable
events to the total number of unambiguous events:
Pf =
f1
N − f2 + f1
=
f1
/
N
1− f2
/
N + f1
/
N
=
p1
1− p2 + p1
. (8)
Comparing this result with Equation (1), we see that Pf is the best
estimate in the linear-vacuous mixture model.
While we have seen evidence earlier in this paper that humans
are unlikely to behave as linear-vacuous (frequentist) DMs in
the described-information setting, it is a reasonable hypothesis
that they may do so in the experienced-information setting. It
should be straightforward to design a study to compare DMs’ best
estimates in equivalent described- and experienced-information
settings.
Conflict from Experience
Thus far, no researchers have attempted to extend the study
of uncertainty in experienced-information settings to include
conflicting information. There are two levels at which conflict
could be experienced: diagnosis of individual trial outcomes
within the same sample, and multiple samples. We will restrict
attention to the individual-trial level. As I have recommended
regarding ambiguity, the requirement here is that at least some
of the trials be conflictive in the sense that two or more
equally credible sources present opposing messages about the
trial outcomes. As is the case with ambiguity, examples of
conflict from experience are not difficult to find. Disagreements
between medical doctors regarding a patient’s diagnosis, between
teachers regarding the mark for a student’s essay, and among
alternative sources of intelligence regarding terrorism risks are
typical examples.
The psychologically relevant distinction between conflicting
outcome messages and ambiguous outcomes in the setup
presented here is that the DM is presented with two or more
distinct sets of outcomes when there is conflict, whereas under
ambiguity there is a range of possible outcomes. Returning to an
earlier example, if 20 out of 50 trials have produced favorable
outcomes but there are an additional 50 trials whose outcomes
are unknown, the resulting interval is [0.2, 0.7]. Now suppose
instead that we have two diagnoses for each trial, with agreement
on 50 of them whereby 20 are favorable according to both
diagnoses. If the remaining 50 trials are conflictive, such that
one diagnosis says all of them are favorable whereas another says
that none of them are, then we have two point-wise probability
estimates, {0.2, 0.7}.
Next, suppose that of the remaining 50 trials, 20 are conflictive
such that one diagnosis identifies five favorable outcomes and
the second diagnosis identifies the other 15 as favorable, and the
other remaining 30 trials are ambiguous. Then according to the
first diagnosis the interval is [0.25, 0.55] and according to the
second it is [0.35, 0.65]. In this type of setup, where the conflicting
messages are restricted to “favorable” vs. “unfavorable,” the
interval widths always will be identical. Differing interval widths
will occur only if at least some of the conflicting messages include
“ambiguous” as one of the alternatives.
The general setup is displayed in Table 2. There are two
diagnoses, D1 and D2, each of which has three possible outcomes:
favorable, ambiguous, or unfavorable. The cells in the table
indicate the joint diagnostic outcomes (e.g., ff indicates that both
D1 and D2 rated the outcome as favorable, and fa indicates
that D1 rated the outcome as favorable and D2 as ambiguous).
The intervals for D1 and D2 are
[
f1
/
N,
(
f1 + a1
) /
N
]
and[
f2
/
N,
(
f2 + a2
) /
N
]
, respectively. The special case described in
the previous paragraph has a1 = a2 = aa, so both intervals must
have identical widths. The general setup relaxes that restriction.
The frequentist DM constructs best estimates from these
intervals in the same way as described in Equation (8). For the
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TABLE 2 | General conflict-ambiguity from experience setup.
D2
Favorable Ambiguous Unfavorable
D1 Favorable ff fa fu f1
Ambiguous af aa au a1
Unfavorable uf ua uu u1
f2 a2 u2 N
D1 and D2 intervals, let
[
f1
/
N,
(
f1 + a1
) /
N
]
=
[
p11, p21
]
and[
f2
/
N,
(
f2 + a2
) /
N
]
=
[
p12, p22
]
, respectively. The frequentist
best estimate for each interval results from substituting the
appropriate pij into Equation (8).
To obtain an overall “best” estimate, a frequentist DM simply
counts the number of favorable and unfavorable diagnoses by D1
andD2. The counts are shown inTable 3. The favorable-favorable
cell, for instance, receives a count of 2 in the left-hand sub-table
because both D1 and D2 rated those outcomes as favorable. The
frequentist best estimate, given the information provided by D1
and D2, is
Pf =
f1 + f2
2N − a1 − a2
=
(
p11 + p12
) /
2
1−
(
p21 + p22
) /
2+
(
p11 + p12
) /
2
.
(9)
The denominator in the left-hand expression in Equation (9)
is the sum of the unambiguous diagnoses returned by D1 and
D2. Note that this is not the only plausible model for an overall
best estimate. For instance, a DM could behave as a frequentist
for best estimates in each interval and then take the midpoint
between them to arrive at an overall best estimate. This setup
readily generalizes to K diagnoses, each of which yields an
interval[pk1, pk2]:
Pf =
K∑
k= 1
fk
KN −
K∑
k= 1
ak
=
K∑
k= 1
p1k
/
K
1−
K∑
k= 1
p2k
/
K +
K∑
k= 1
p1k
/
K
. (10)
In the special case where ak = aa,Pf reduces to the mean of the
frequentist best estimates for each of the Dk intervals.
As with the frequentist best estimates of single intervals, Pf in
Equation (10) is a probability for which the means of the interval
limits,
∑K
k= 1 p1k
/
K and
∑K
k= 1 p2k
/
K, are the corresponding
lower and upper probabilities of Walley (1991, p. 93–94) linear-
vacuous mixture. Denoting the mean of the interval widths by∑K
k= 1 p2k
/
K−
∑K
k= 1 p1k
/
K = w, from Equation (10) we have∑K
k= 1 p1k
/
K = (1− w)Pf and
∑K
k= 1 p2k
/
K = (1− w)Pf+w.
Finally, we may consider a frequentist approach to assessing
conflict and ambiguity, for comparison with the models
developed in the second section of this paper.Table 4 displays the
counts for ambiguity and conflict in the experienced-information
setup.
The relative frequency of ambiguous diagnoses is simply
P (a) = (a1 + a2)
/
2N, (11)
TABLE 3 | Favorable and unfavorable counts in the
experienced-information setup.
Favorable Unfavorable
Fav. Ambig. Unfav. Fav. Ambig. Unfav.
Favorable 2 1 1 f1 0 0 1
Ambiguous 1 0 0 a1 0 0 1
Unfavorable 1 0 0 u1 1 1 2
f2 a2 u2 f2 a2 u2
TABLE 4 | Ambiguity and conflict counts in the experienced-information
setup.
Ambiguity Conflict
Fav. Ambig. Unfav. Fav. Ambig. Unfav.
Favorable 0 1 0 f1 0 1 1
Ambiguous 1 2 1 a1 1 0 1
Unfavorable 0 1 0 u1 1 1 0
f2 a2 u2 f2 a2 u2
and the relative frequency of conflicting diagnoses is
P (c) =
(
N − ff − aa− uu
) /
N. (12)
It can be shown that P(a) is the average of the interval widths and
therefore corresponds to one of the distance models in Smithson
(2013), so Equation (11) does not provide a model of ambiguity
assessment that differs from those in the described-information
framework. However, P(c) does not correspond to any of the
conflict assessment models developed by Smithson (2013), and
therefore is unique to the experienced-information setting.
Future Directions
The material presented in this paper paves the way for extending
our understanding of how judgments and decisions are jointly
affected by conflict and ambiguity in both described- and
experienced-information settings. The models of “best” estimates
and subjective assessments of ambiguity and conflict can be
tested and compared in both settings. They also can be utilized
to predict choice behavior under conflict and ambiguity. I will
conclude this paper with two additional suggestions regarding
research in this domain: investigating the effects of positive vs.
negative wording, and studying evaluations of and preferences
for alternative ambiguous and/or conflicting estimates.
The literature on probability judgements has included
investigations into the effects of wording verbal probability
expressions (PEs) positively (e.g., “likely”) vs. negatively (e.g.,
“unlikely”). However, the analogous topic of positive vs. negative
wording regarding ambiguity (e.g., “clear” vs. “unclear”) or
conflict (e.g., “strongly agreeing” vs. “strongly disagreeing”) has
not been studied at all. A reasonable question, then, is whether
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negative and positive wording could yield different effects on
perceptions of ambiguity and conflict.
Several studies have found evidence that “positive” and
“negative” PEs induce different actions and interpretations.
Teigen and Brun (2003) show that most PEs are unidirectional
and that the set of positive PEs is larger, and covers more of the
probability scale, than the set of negative PEs. Teigen and Brun
(2003) also find that, everything else being equal, the choice of
positive or negative PEs can influence perceptions of correctness
of the forecasts, surprise upon learning the outcome of events,
and decisions based on these communications.
Additional effects of positive vs. negative wording were
identified in Smithson et al.’s (2012) reanalysis of the Budescu’s
et al. (2009) data on public interpretations of PEs in the
fourth IPCC report. Smithson et al.’s reanalyses revealed several
findings not articulated in the Budescu et al. paper. Chief among
these were considerably greater regression toward the middle
of the [0, 1] interval, less consensus and poorer accuracy in
translations of negative PEs than in translations of positive
ones. Consequently, the variability was greater in the negatively-
worded PEs (1) because the mean response was more regressive,
and (2) because of greater response variation that could not
be accounted for by the difference between means alone. Both
of these findings suggest that people find negatively-worded
PEs more ambiguous than positively-worded PEs, and that
there is greater disagreement among them about the meanings
of negatively-worded PEs. These results regarding positive
vs. negative PEs can be applied to investigations of positive
vs. negative wording of phrases referring to ambiguity and
conflict.
Turning now to evaluations and preferences, Yaniv and Foster
(1995, 1997) suggested that judgments and evaluations of interval
estimates are the product of two competing objectives: accuracy
and informativeness. They presented evidence that people tend
to prefer narrow but inaccurate interval estimates over wide
but accurate ones, i.e., they value informativeness more than
accuracy.
Smithson’s (2013) paradigm in which participants are asked to
compare two pairs of estimates (which may be both ambiguous
and conflicting) could be adapted easily to study the joint
effects of ambiguity and conflict on the accuracy-informativeness
tradeoff. Participants would be asked to choose which pair of
estimates they prefer when the correct answer is revealed to
them, and to assess each pair’s informativeness and accuracy.
A corresponding setup in an experienced-information setting
would have participants sample from an environment after they
have been given alternative predictive estimates of outcome
probabilities for that environment.
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